0. Overview
The necessary conditions for Perfect Competition are so strict
that it does not, in fact, exist in the real world. It is an
ideal, an ideological benchmark against which outcomes under Imperfect Competition
can be assessed. This includes, to a degree, Oligopoly where the Standard
Model comes to its geometric end with
Sweezy's Kinked Demand Curve.
Since the 1940s constrained profit maximization under Oligopoly has mutated into Game
Theory which operates outside the geometric elegance of the Standard Model.
Nonetheless, if one uses Perfect Competition as the benchmark
then outcomes under Imperfect Competition represent Market Failure to
allocate sufficient resources to attain a perfectly competitive
price/quantity outcome, a.k.a., allocative inefficiency.
There are, however, other forms of Market
Failure. These include Externalities, i.e., costs and
benefits external to market price, and Public Goods, i.e.,
socially valuable goods and services that firms cannot profitably
produce or that the Public does not want them to produce, e.g., national
defense.
Put another way, we have, up to now, implicitly assumed that all
relevant benefits and costs of production are reflected in market price
paid by the consumer and received by the producer. What happens if
we relax that assumption? In what follows the nature of and alternative policy solutions to
different forms of Market Failure are examined. Finally, the
nature and limitations of Public Choice Theory will be considered, i.e.,
How is Public Choice made to mitigate pernicious
effects of Market Failure?
1. Market Power
Unlike
Perfect Competition under all forms of Imperfect Competition producers
supply a smaller quantity at a higher price, generate a deadweight loss of consumer & producer surplus
while some consumer surplus is appropriated as excess,
economic or monopoly profit.
Furthermore, in the long run Imperfect Competition fails to attain the
lowest average cost per unit output.
Under Imperfect Competition firms are thus price makers
rather than price takers as under Perfect Competition. They
exercise Market Power defined as the ability to determine the price/quantity outcome in the market. The Public Choice is whether
Equity requires intervention to protect consumers? Whether or not
Equity or any other moral principle justifies public intervention in the
marketplace is considered in
4. Public Choice.
i -Monopoly
(MKM C15/331-4;
312-15,
345-349;
322-325)
In the case of Monopoly the sources of Market Power may be:
(a)
economies of scale/network economies resulting in a Natural Monopoly; (b) exclusive
possession of a critical input to the production process; (c) State
grant of intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as copyrights, patents,
registered industrial designs or trademarks; and/or, (d) State grant of
a public francise over a natural monopoly or grant of self-regulating authority, e.g., to accountants, architects, dentists,
engineers, lawyers and medical doctors, a.k.a., the
self-regulating professions or the Practices:
a) in the case of a
Natural Monopoly rooted in economies of scale, one firm can satisfy all
market demand at the lowest possible average cost (MKM
Fig. 15.1). In response to any entrant the monopolist can drop
price below the break-even point of any aspiring rival. There are at least two policy
solutions. The first is to place the Monopoly under public ownership.
This a generally done only when output is considered critical to public
welfare, e.g., municipal water and sewage systems. The
technical term is a 'franchise'. The second alternative is to
regulate the Monopoly in an attempt to reduce price and
increase
quantity approximating the outcome of Perfect Competition.
Net economies enjoyed by firms in the global
knowledge-based/digital economy (KB/DE) present a new problem for the
State. Traditionally the test has been higher prices to consumers
and how to lower them. In the KB/DE many services have no market
price, zero $s - Google maps & search, Facebook, Twiter, Youtube,
Instagram ...... The price paid is personal information monetized
as targeted psychographic advertising - commercial and political.
Currently governments around the world are examining how to deal
with the information/content net economies enjoyed by the Tech
monopolies. For those interested, please see (non-testable):
The Unfinished Revolution: Arts
Management in a 21st Century Knowledge-Based/Digital Economy,
June, 2019.
Value without Price or Value Theory Redux, Compiler Press, May 13,
2018
Disruptive Solutions to Problems associated with the Global
Knowledge-Based/Digital Economy, Compiler Press, Oct. 2016;
b) in the case of a Monopoly based on exclusive possession of
a physical input there are also at least two policy
solutions - break up the monopoly into a number of smaller, competing
firms or regulate it. The classic case is Standard Oil of New
Jersey founded by John D. Rockefeller Sr. The firm
controlled virtually all oil and oil refining in the U.S.A.
In 1911 the Supreme Court of the United States broke up the firm into 34
separate companies;
c) in the case of a Monopoly based on IPRs,
there are three alternative policy solutions - break up the monopoly,
regulate it or amend its IPRs. Thus Microsoft was, like Standard
Oil, threatened with break up during the Clinton administration in the
1990s. It was proposed to break up the firm into three distinct
companies - one each for Windows operating system, Office applications
and Server software. The subsequent George W. Bush Administration
choose to regulate. In the European Union, however, Microsoft was
required to open up its 'interface’ code to competitors to allow their
products to work smoothly with Windows and thereby compete in the
marketplace. This 'interface’ was unpublished and treated as a trade
secret by Microsoft as remains the case with the ‘kernel’ of its
operating system. Alternatively IPRs can
be legally amended, e.g., requiring compulsory licensing, shortening duration or abrogating
some or all rights; and,
d) in the case of a Monopoly based on a State grant of self-regulating
authority, a.k.a., the Practices, there are a number of policy
solutions: (i) change their charters; (ii) regulate their
procedures and rates,
e.g., under Medicare; (iii) pass profession-specific legislation,
e.g., the U.S. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, also known as the
"Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act"; or, (iv)
as in
Germany and Austria, make the Practices constitutionally
recognized and accountable for their actions and standards.
ii - Monopolistic
Competition (MKM C16/356-9;
336-8,
361-363;
332-334)
In the case of Monopolistic Competition, with many small
firms, the source of Market Power is product differentiation.
However, while in the short run excess, economic or monopoly profits are earned,
in the long run excess profit is eliminated by free entry into the
marketplace (MKM Fig's
16.2 a &
16.3). The Public Choice is whether product differentiation is
worth the added cost to consumers? Generally the answer is yes and
the State does not intervene other than for health and safety reasons.
iii - Oligopoly (MKM
C17/383-7; 360-3,
386-391)
In the case of Oligopoly a few large firms dominate the
industry accompanied by a competitive fringe of smaller firms. Market Power
under Oligopoly generally results from some combination of: (a) economies of scale/network
economies;
(b) process/product differentiation; (c) process/product innovation; (d)
collusion; and/or (e) legal tactics. In the case of economies of scale, if there are several
competing firms break up is not usually a policy option. With respect to
product differentiation and innovation Public Choice involves
determining whether such benefits out weigh the added cost to consumers. In
this regard it is important to note that under Perfect Competition firms
are lean, mean fighting machines with no excess profit to finance long
term research and development leading to innovation or to launch major
advertising campaigns. It is,
however, with respect to collusion that regulation, e.g., of the
Canadian cell phone industry, is not an option but rather a necessity
involving competition policies
that, among other things, prohibit price fixing which is common in oligopolistic
industries.
As with a regulated monopoly, regulation of
an oligopoly begins with an estimate of the price/quantity under
perfection competition (or a milder form called 'workable competition').
To do so an estimate of the supply/marginal cost curve is necessary but
obtaining the 'real' data is often accompanied by an imperfect
competitor 'padding' costs, effectively shifting the supply curve to the
left, raising market price and lowering output, thereby preserving some
of its economic profit even under regulation. This can also be
accompanied by what is called 'the regulator being captured by the
regulatee".
Problems associated with regulation are
discussed in more detail below under
4. Public Choice.
2.
Externalities
(MKM
C10/211-231; 198-216,
218-238;
201-219)
Until now we have assumed that the market price for a good or
service includes or
internalizes all relevant costs and benefits. This means the
consumer captures all the benefits and the producer pays all the costs.
Such goods & services are called perfectly private goods. An externality refers to costs or benefits not captured by market
price, i.e., they are external to market price. In effect,
the market demand curve reflects
only the
marginal private benefit
(MPB) curve of consumers but not external benefits to society
as a whole. When external benefits are added, vertically, to the
market demand curve we derive the
marginal social benefit
(MSB)
curve
inclusive of both private and public marginal benefits.
Similarly, if there are external costs to production, i.e.,
not explicit costs to the producer, the market supply curve reflects
only the
marginal private costs
(MPC) not costs external to the firm’s bottom line,
e.g., pollution costs that society must pay. When social
costs are added, vertically, to the market supply curve we derive
the
marginal social cost
(MSC) curve inclusive of both private and public costs.
The Standard Model is based on the assumption that all relevant
costs and benefits are internalized in market price, i.e.,
there are no externalities. If this is true then ‘X’ marks the
spot. If, however, there are externalities then market
equilibrium is not allocatively efficient nor is the greatest good
for the greatest number achieved. If a social optimum
equilibrium is to be achieved then a Public Choice must be made as
to the costs and benefits of intervention in the marketplace and
alternative public policy solutions to mitigate negative
externality-generating goods (demerit goods) and foster positive
externality-generating ones (merit goods). The appropriateness
of public intervention in general including Market Failure due to
Externalities is discussed under
4. Public Choice.
Ideally,
external or social costs and benefits should be added to private costs
and benefits reflected not by market supply and demand curves but rather
by the MSB & MSC curves. The point is that external costs must be
paid and external benefits must be accounted for if the socially optimal
price/quantity equilibrium is to be established. The agency to do
so is not the market but rather the State. Put another way, the
market 'X' solution is superseded by a social ‘X” marking the spot where
allocative efficiency exists and achieves the greatest good for the
greatest number. It is thus up to the State to correct the
miscalculation of private agents to achieve
a socially optimal equilibrium.
We will now examine examples of negative and positive externalities and
alternative public policy solutions
i - Negative
Externalities
(MKM
C10/214-17; 201-4,
221-224;
203-206)
There are many forms of negative externalities but the most
widely recognized is environmental pollution. Recognition of such
negative externalities tends to be the result of increasing
income, education and especially new
scientific knowledge revealing the unintended social costs of production.
Thus
the modern environmental movement was born with publication of
Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 1962. DDT had been a
boon to both military and civilian operations during WWII.
Malaria, yellow fever and other mosquito-borne disease was dramatically
reduced. No one knew it built up in the food chain leading to
thinning birds' eggs and hence to the
Silent Spring.
There are five major types of environmental
pollution:
a) air pollution mainly caused by
road transportation and
industrial processes;
b) biological pollution mainly
caused by:
ocean-going vessels
dumping bilge water, e.g.,
lampreys, zebra mussels, fishhook water fleas, etc.; agricultural
import of foreign organisms to counter infestations, e.g., the
sugar cane frog in Australia;and, by consumers dumping exotic pets,
e.g., pythons in the Florida Everglades
c) land pollution mainly caused by
industrial waste and by consumers;
d) sound and light pollution mainly
caused by urbanization; and,
e) water pollution mainly caused by
industrial waste (land and sea) and farm run off.
With respect to production, firms do not internalize
external costs because they are not out-of-pocket expenses and therefore
are not reported in the firm's bottom line (MKM Fig. 10.2).
This leads
to a lower price and higher output relative to the social optimum.
It also means that society as a whole must pay these external costs,
e.g., increased health and/or purification costs and suffer a
deadweight loss of producer and consumer surplus (MKM Fig. 10.3).
Negative externalities in
consumption of, for example, demerit goods such as drugs, gambling,
smoking, pornography, etc., are similarly not included in a
firm's accounting. As with
negative externalities in production this leads to
a lower price and higher output relative to the social optimum. It
also means that society as a whole must pay such costs, e.g.,
increased health and/or social costs and suffer a deadweight loss of
producer and consumer surplus. And what about
elasticity?
The Public Choice is if and how to make firms internalize
such costs and achieve a socially optimum price/quantity equilibrium.
There are five basic policy tools: prosecution, property
rights (including quotas), regulation, subsidies and taxation.
a) Prosecution
To the degree a firm's
negative externalities result in damage to individuals or communities
they are subject to civil action as a tort, i.e., a civil wrong
unfairly causing loss or harm
to someone else
and creating legal liability for the individual or firm
committing the act. To the degree harm results in loss of life or
limb or threatens national security, criminal proceedings by the State
are also possible. In both cases legal costs as well as any damage
settlement increases cost to the firm shifting the supply curve up to
the left, ideally merging with the MSC curve and achieving a socially
optimal price-quantity equilibrium;
b) Property Rights (MKM
C10/228-30; 213-16;
235-237;
216-218)
Arguably externalities arise due to a lack of property
rights, i.e.,
arrangements governing ownership of factors of production as well as
consumer goods and services. Property rights establish legal title
enforceable by the courts. Externalities, however, generally
arise as unintended consequences initially not recognized or owned by
anyone. Once recognized, however, the State may establish property
rights and assign ownership. It is important to note that
Economics does not operate in a vacuum. It is the Law that
ultimately defines what is property, i.e., what can be bought and
sold and therefore what legitimate markets may exist.
If
property rights exists and transaction costs are low then private
transactions can resolve an negative externality, e.g., water
pollution from a plant, (P&B 4th Ed.
Fig. 20.3;
P&B
7th Ed Fig. 16.3).
At
first glance it would seem that to whom a property right is assigned is
significant but assuming transaction costs are low then the
outcome will be the same.
Thus if
the polluter owns the river then victims must pay to abate it; if
victims own the river then the polluter must pay. In either case
MSB should eventually equal MSC. This is known as the
Coase Theorem (MKM 229-30; 214-16;
236-237;
217-218).
If
transaction costs are high, however, then private transaction are
inadequate to resolve the problem. Thus if
there are dozens of polluters and/or many victims, e.g., many
different municipalities along the river, then transaction costs may be
high (sometimes higher than the cost of the negative externality) and
the State may choose to intervene. Usually a scientific assessment
is made of the sustainable level of pollution and a quantity (quota)
becomes available to be divided among polluters as
marketable permits (MKM
C10/224-6; 209-12;
228-234).
In effect, the State creates
a property right and market in pollution. Competition among
polluters should raise the price discouraging more pollution
and encouraging the search for non-polluting technologies (MKM Fig. 10.5b).
Exceeding the permitted level leads to increased
competition for permits or punitive penalties enforced through the
courts.
c) Regulation
In a sense all State intervention in the economy involves
regulation. Legislation sets out the
strategy and tactical means for politically justified intervention but
the logistics, where the rubber hits the road, takes the form of rules &
regulations often developed and always enforced by the bureaucracy.
In
the case of State intervention justified by Externalities the first cost
is detection, i.e., determining
there is an externality and, in the case of a negative externality like
pollution, what is its sustainable economic level? This is usual
accomplished through scientific or policy research. Then follows
Legislation and then Rules & Regulations.
In directing the industry towards a socially optimum
outcome. Ideally the associated cost of State enforcement should
appear in the analytic geometry of the extended Standard Model. Compliance costs (filling out forms and answering questions) paid by
either the producer or consumer should be included as
a part of the social cost curve in the case of a negative externality or
as part of the subsidy shifting the private marginal cost curve in the
case of a positive externality.
d) Taxation
& Subsidies (MKM
C10/220-1;
207-209;
226-228)
Alternatively, the State may tax
polluters rather than establish a market permit system. Ideally
using a scientific assessment the State can set a price per unit of
pollution
or emission charges
based on marginal social
cost/benefit analysis
(P&B
7th Ed Fig. 16.4). To the degree firms treat taxes as a cost of
doing business the tax is added to their production function causing a
shift of the industry supply curve up to the left raising costs to
polluters until it ideally merges with the MSC cost curve.
By contrast, subsidies can be used
to reduce the cost of substitutes (cross elasticity). Thus subsidies to nuclear, solar and wind
power should reduce demand for coal, gas and oil in turn reducing pollution and its external costs.
ii - Positive
Externalities
(MKM
C10/217-19; 204-06;
224-225;
206-207)
There are many forms of positive externalities but the most widely
recognized is higher education. A rational student will calculate the
increase in life long earnings from an additional year of higher
education and compare it to the cost of that extra year. Such a
student, however, does not include in the calculation external benefits
to society as a whole. Accordingly a socially optimal level of
education does not occur. Such benefits include reduced
youth-related crime or, as an old professor of mine noted: "Universities
and colleges are concentration camps for youth. If they are in a
classroom they are not on the street doing rude and naughty things".
Furthermore, society benefits from more educated people who can better
communicate and innovate.
There are two principle ways to achieve the socially optimal level of
education. The first is to subsidize the supplier, e.g.,
State grants per student to universities and colleges, shifting the
supply curve to the right, lowering the price of tuition and encouraging
more students to stay in school, ideally at the optimum level. The
second is to subsidize students, e.g., bursaries, grants, loans,
scholarships, etc., effective lowering the cost of
education and shifting the demand curve to the rights until, ideally, it
merges with the MSB curve leading to a socially optimal outcome
(P&B 7th Ed
Fig. 16.5 & 16.6 &
Fig. 16.7;
MKM Fig. 10.4).
There are also private positive
externalities such as good neighbourhood effects including well kept
lawns, flower beds, etc., that cost the pssing visitor nothing but
pleasure. There are in fact a range of
merit goods that the State chooses to support because of their positive
externalities. Examples include the Arts, scientific and
industrial research & development and many other non-profit or Third
Sector activities. Subsidies are provided by the State in the form
of
grants and tax exemption.
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