The Competitiveness of Nations in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy
Edgar Zilsel
Phenomenology and Natural Science
Philosophy of
Science, 8 (1
Jan. 1941, 26-32.
When phenomenology was introduced as
a new science by Husserl its methods were applied first to objects of logic.
Later phenomenological
investigation expanded gradually to the fields of psychology, ethics, esthetics,
and sociology (Scheler, Pfänder, Hildebrand a.o.). More rarely, objects of the natural
sciences have been treated phenomenologically. Scattered indications of this kind are to
be found in authors who do not belong to the most intimate circle of Husserl’s
school (Helmut Plessner, Kurt Goldstein, Walter Frost, E. Buenning). Extensively, however, the
phenomenological method has been applied to objects of the natural sciences once
only, namely by Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a favorite pupil of Husserl’s, in her
Realontologie (Ontology of Reality) and Farben
(Colors). 1 Yet this less known branch of phenomenology is
particularly interesting. Husserl
stressed the basic difference between phenomenological ideation (Wesensschau)
on the one hand and psychological introspection and description of the
immediate data of awareness on the other. The peculiarity and scientific
productivity of phenomenological method, therefore, can studied best in a field
which is as far removed from psychology as possible. We shall try to analyze the papers of
Conrad-
1. Jahrbachflir Philosophie u.
phanomenologische Forschung vol. 6 (1923) pp. 159-333 and Ergänzungsband
(1929) pp. 339-370.
Martius more fully and shall refer
to other authors occasionally as illustrations.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius investigates
matter and its qualities for more than two hundred pages by means of a priori
ideation. She distinguishes three
possible forms of reality, the forms of body, soul, and mind. Body belongs to nature, mind is
supernatural, soul subnatural (§131). God belongs to all of the three realms,
whereas angels are minds only (ibid.). The three states of matter, solid,
liquid, and gaseous, correspond to and are “symbols” (§I33) or “analogies”
(§I34) of body, soul, and mind respectively. This is, as the author puts it (§I34),
“not a construction but is based on conception of pure phenomena from the
intuitive power of which we can not withdraw”. Although the three states of matter can
be investigated in detail by experiments only, their general characteristics can
be given phenomenologically. To
wit, there are three possible ways in which the particles of matter can combine.
There is the “anarchic” structure
in which everyone is against every other one. Thus results general repulsion and the
gaseous state. There is the
“atomistic” structure, everyone being for himself, with mutual indifference and
the liquid state resulting. And
finally, in the “communist” structure everyone is for everyone, and unity and
the solid state result (§162). This
is the “a priori characterization” of the three states of matter. There follows an a priori discussion of
hardness, brittleness, softness etc. and of glass, crystals, and metals. The essence of metallicity e.g. is
suppleness i.e. “the combination of valiant power, compliance, and
self-preservation” (§175).
The following sections deal with
sound, temperature, and light. In
sounds the essence of material objects manifests itself sensually (§189 ff.).
The essence of temperature is
immediate affection of the human body: the state of the thing directly acts upon
the state of the body (§200), warmth corresponding to life, cold to death
(§201). Light is “the most
wonderful phenomenon”: the author refers to God’s words “Let there be Light”
(§212). When a thing is made
red-hot it reaches a peak of activity, an eruption occurs, and it begins to
glow. “Primary
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luminous state is ecstasy of matter…
These are not metaphorical phrases but must be taken most literally and
verbally” (§217). Later this statement is amended somewhat:
light is not ecstasy of matter but ecstasy of matter “posits” light
(§237), or even better “implies”
light (§239). The last thirty pages deal
with colors referring to Goethe’s theory, which however is partially criticized.
Blue is the color of Mary’s coat
and of the magic flower, it is the color of humility. Purple is the color of majesty, brown of
monks’ cowls, wood and plainness etc. (§§279 ff.).
Historically the exposition is
influenced by German Romanticism, by Novalis, Schelling, and Baader, a
contemporary of Schelling with theosophical leanings, who is quoted several
times (§§118, 131). The trichotomy of matter,
soul, and mind can be traced back even to the Gnostics (Hippolytus, Valentinus).
As to method the difference from
the natural sciences is stressed (§§145, 159, 162, 185). Yet some results are based on
experiments, though on experiments performed by means of quite elementary
physical instruments. E.g. in
discussing brittleness the definition of a textbook on mineralogy is quoted and
agreed with (§171).
Apparently the use of steel points and chisels is compatible with a
priori Wesensschau, the use of galvanometers and X-ray tubes is not.
Several statements which are
expressly said to originate in a priori Wesensschau obviously are based
on experience. E.g. it is
emphasized (§278) that we hear
immediately in the sound of an object whether the object is hard, liquid, or
elastic; it would be “delusion” to ascribe this to association of ideas.
Likewise it is maintained (§278)
that we immediately see whether a piece of butter is hard or soft. It would be instructive to test these
phenomenological statements with individuals who never had touched objects of
the kind in question before. The
experiences which, unconsciously, are utilized again and again are, however,
rather defective. E.g. it is
deduced a priori, as it is claimed, from the mere essence of fire (§229) that water is opposite to it
and, consequently, extinguishes it; the fact that fire is extinguished e.g. by
carbon dioxide as well is omitted, presumably because this occurs more rarely
in
everyday life. Or it is explained a priori that light
comes into existence by glowing (§§2I3-219). The fact that there is also
cold light (phosphorescence, luminescence) is omitted. All these a priori expositions, as they
are claimed to be, are in fact primitive and, consequently, defective and rather
often incorrect natural science. Some statements, being based on vague
preconceived ideas, are entirely arbitrary and quite insusceptible of
confirmation. E.g. genuine metals,
such as steel, are distinguished from spurious metals, such as aluminum (§175); genuine liquids, such as water,
from spurious liquids, such as molten gold (§159). This distinction is supported by
linguistic considerations: gold melts and becomes solid, whereas ice thaws and
freezes; “on this difference much could be said phenomenologically” the author
says (ibid.). It may be mentioned
that in several other articles also of the Jahrbuch fuer Philosophie
2
linguistic and merely verbal
investigations play a considerable part. Certain phenomenological subtleties are
so closely linked with the peculiarities of German syntax and vocabulary that
they cannot be translated at all into other languages. We need not point out that our author
makes abundant use of vague associations of ideas particularly in her symbolic
interpretations and analogies.
The investigation never provides a
method of testing and verifying the results obtained and never seeks after the
causes of the phenomena discussed. This is the most essential difference
from the method of the natural sciences. Yet the ends, values, and meanings of the
phenomena are discussed again and again. We shall give a few examples: presenting
itself in its state of rigidity is “the peculiar end” of glass (§178); metals are “noble”, gold and
steel are “perfect metals” and their perfection is “marvellous” (§176); there are two kinds of flames,
holy flames which are unselfish and radiant, and unholy flames, being selfish
and smoky (§§225-228, 244-248).
As to symbolic interpretation of
the phenomena we need not repeat the numerous examples quoted before. Obviously it is assumed that
Wesensschau is
2.
e.g. H. Aumann: Zum deutschen Impersonale,
Ergänzungsbd. (1929) pp. 1 ff.; F. Neumann: Die Sinneinheit des
Satzes and das indogermanische Verbum, ibid. pp. 297 ff.
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able to recognize the ends,
meanings, and values of the phenomena a priori, whereas their causes can be
found empirically only and, consequently, must be left to natural scientists.
This is expressed rather clearly by
Hans André, a philosopher who is near to phenomenology, in his book on
Archetype and Cause in Biology (Urbild und Ursache in der Biologie,
Muenchen 1931). There he states e.g. that (p.
94) green conforms to the essence of plants since by their destination plants
are open to light. This aspect of
the problem is said to be the highest. On a lower scientific level the green
color of plants is investigated teleologically and on the lowest level causally.
Altogether disregard of causality
is even more conspicuous in phenomenological ontology than disregard of
experience.
In his prefatory remarks to the
first volume of the Jahrbuch fuer Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung
Husserl declares phenomenology to be “an unlimited field of strictly
scientific investigation”. The new
periodical shall be “not an arena of vague reformatory ideas but a place of
serious scientific work”. It may be
left to the readers to decide whether this promise has been kept in
Conrad-Martius’ investigation of physical phenomena. Historically the method used by her is
not so new as it seems to be. Natural phenomena were viewed and
discussed teleologically and their meanings were interpreted a priori long
before their causes were investigated. These pre-scientific methods were
familiar to Babylonian and Indian priests as well as to Chinese mandarins and
medieval scholastics. When St.
Hildegard of Bingen declared in the 12th century that rivers rise in the
sea and flow uphill 3
she certainly used a method of
knowledge which cannot have been so different from phenomenological
Wesensschau. Hedwig
Conrad-Martius sometimes approaches ideas that are even more ancient. Her statement that the gaseous state
corresponds to and is a symbol of mind revives primeval animistic ideas of
breath-like soul. The analogy
between phenomenological and prescientific methods is confirmed by the
exposition of a historian of philosophy who is influenced by Husserl’s ideas.
Walter Frost in his book on
3. Subtilitates II, 5 (Migne, Patres
Latini, vol. 197)
Francis Bacon 4
emphasizes
that Bacon’s natural philosophy anticipates ideas of the last decades. Actually the non-causal elements in
Bacon’s concept of “form” which Frost has in mind are less anticipations of
modern phenomenology than remnants of medieval
scholasticism.
The rise of phenomenological
ontology can be understood historically most adequately if it is viewed in
connection with the remarkable anticausal rebellion in the philosophy of the
last fifty years. Since about 1890 in European, especially in
German philosophy, new methodological concepts have been advocated: values in
Windelband, Rickert, and their school, ends and aims in neovitalism, ideal types
in Dilthey and Max Weber, interpretation of meaning in Troeltsch. With these new methods phenomenological
Wesensschau belongs. All of
them have in common that they do not provide a method of testing and confirming
the results obtained, that they are meant to supplant causal investigation and,
in the final analysis, that they are familiar to prescientific civilizations.
Oriental priests and scholars,
medieval monks have always interpreted the meanings of phenomena, have viewed
their essences, values, and ends, and distinguished and classified types. Since the beginning of the seventeenth
century, since the period of Galileo, these prescientific methods gradually were
displaced by causal and verifiable investigation. There is hardly another characteristic
that distinguishes western civilization and the modern era as distinctly
spiritually as does the predominance of causal research. The fact that the precausal methods are
being revived again at present is a most remarkable phenomenon in the history of
ideas, and one which probably can be explained sociologically only. The surface of a river shows
countercurrents and eddies only, when a rock is hidden on the bottom. Unfortunately the causal explanation of
the anticausal tendencies in modern philosophy and sociology is highly complex
and cannot even be attempted here.
We have analyzed phenomenological
ontology only. In this field the
background of the new methods is particularly
4.
Bacon and die Naturphilosophie,
Muenchen 1927, pp. 81 ff., 103
ff.
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clear. The application of phenomenology in the
fields of logic, psychology, and sociology have not been discussed. Certainly the relationship of logic and
psychology offers subtle problems; certainly it is necessary first to ascertain
and describe the data of awareness and the mere facts of society before their
connections and changes are investigated. It may be doubted whether phenomenology
has formulated these problems correctly. It is especially open to question,
whether it has separated the real problems from pseudoproblems originating in
verbal expression only. It is
rather obvious, however, that in these other fields too the historical roots of
the phenomenological method are to be found in the remarkable endeavor to
substitute the methods of causal research.
International Institute of Social
Research,
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