The Competitiveness of Nations in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy
Book Review, The Economist April 25, 1981, p.111
English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850 -
1980
By Martin J. Wiener.
CUP. 217 pages. £9.95. Available
from CUP, New York.
What kind of person said the following in a speech in
the 1940s?
I believe that the worship of material values is the fatal disease from which our age is suffering, and that, if we do not eradicate this worship, it will inevitably destroy our whole society and not even leave us any business to discuss. We must steadfastly keep on reminding ourselves all the time that material efficiency is only a means and not an end.
Are these the words of a high-minded socialist? A country vicar? Possibly a member of the royal family, in
sententious mood?
No, none of these. The reference to business provides a
clue. They are the words of Samuel
Courtauld, a prominent British industrialist evincing that suspicion of the
modern world and those self-doubts about the capitalist ethic and material
progress that have distinguished British businessmen from their opposite numbers
in other countries since at least the 1850s. The Crystal Palace had scarcely been
built when there set in a powerful reaction against the very industrial
civilization it stood for. Britain’s business was not, after all, to
be business.
Professor Wiener’s concern is to document the ambiguity
about - indeed the hostility towards - industrialism and business values that
still pervades Britain’s elite culture. He is an American. Probably only a foreigner could have
approached the subject with such sensitivity and
detachment.
In the 1850s, he says in effect, two cultures warred for
England’s soul. One believed in
buying and selling, in making money, in creating large markets, in technical
innovation, in the industrialist and the engineer as the main agents of human
progress; the other believed in hierarchy, continuity, the existing class
structure, in the supremacy of spiritual over material values. One culture stood for science and
technology, economic growth, the spread of cities, the career open to the talents, the pursuit of
economic self-interest; the other stood for leisure, the countryside, gardening,
arts and crafts, love of the past and disinterested public
service.
After a remarkably short battle, Professor Wiener
maintains, the. culture of gentility triumphed - or, more precisely, an uneasy
accommodation was reached, permitting the pursuit of profit but only provided
the industrialist paid lip service to older values which, in the end, were not
his own. The greatest of Victorian
engineers, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, sent two of his sons to Harrow, where
science was scarcely taught and the sons of businessmen were looked down on.
Cobden despaired: “feudalism is
every day more and more in the ascendant in political and social life”. In the United States and Germany, to this
day, Mr Freddie Laker, genius of the marketplace and millionaire, would be
probably be well content; in Britain, only Sir Freddie Laker has really
arrived.
Professor Wiener believes - and your reviewer agrees
with him - that this persistence of anti-industrial values is far more important
in accounting for Britain’s relative economic decline than the loss of empire,
high taxation, excessive government spending, shortages of capital, militant
trade unions or the lack of natural resources. In all of these connections, either the
argument does not apply to Britain at all (Britain has abundant natural
resources and no real shortage of capital), or else it does apply to Britain but
applies equally to other industrial countries without producing the same results
(Germans pay high taxes and France, too, lost an empire). Only in Britain is there a cultural
“cordon sanitaire encircling the forces of economic development -
technology, industry, commerce”. In
the world’s first industrial nation, Professor Wiener observes, industrialism
does not seem quite at home.
If this is so, what is to be done? Professor Wiener is an historian and does
not say. But a foreigner, regarding
the British quizzically and with some distaste, might suggest taxing the public schools out of existence, doing
away with the honours list, imposing
heavy excise duties on
old houses and gardening tools, taxing commerce more heavily than industry, abolishing
all taxes on profits in manufacturing industry, squeezing the incomes of the professional classes, actively
discouraging unpaid public service and importing foreigners at large salaries to
manage British companies. Of course
it would all be very un-British, but then Britishness is precisely the
problem.
Professor Wiener’s analysis is by no means entirely
novel, and most of the best
phrases in his book are quotations from other writers. Even so, this is an important book, one
that deserves to be read and pondered on by everybody who has some portion of Britain’s destiny in his (or her)
hands.