The Competitiveness of Nations
in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy
February 2004
Ekkehart Schlicht *
Aestheticism in the Theory of Custom **
Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines
Volume 70, numéro
1, Mars 2000, pp 33-51
Index
5. A Critique of Structuralism
8. Structuralism and Aestheticism
10. Selecting for Rule Preference
First we may observe, that the supposition, that the
future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is
derived entirely from habit, by which we are determined to expect for the future
the same train of objects, to which we have been accustomed.
David Hume
(1740, 134)
Customs, habits, and routines provide the bedrock for many economic and
social formations yet our understanding of the processes that underlie the
growth and decay of customs is very limited. The theory of social evolution has hardly
commenced to evolve.
The ‘clarity’ view of custom proposed in my recent book On Custom in
the Economy posits the desire of individuals to detect patterns in their
social environment and to act in a patterned fashion. They have a ‘rule preference’, and this gives
rise to the formation of customs and social evolution. In this essay, I offer some supplementary
arguments which support this position from the perspective of learning theory
and evolutionary psychology.
The first issue to be dealt with relates to learning (Sections 2 to 8).
What processes should we envisage for
the way in which the rules of custom are learned by individuals in a society? Obviously the rules of custom and social
interaction must be learned. It is
usually taken for granted that this learning proceeds in an adaptive way, and
it is assumed that people find out one way or another what
is best for them and adjust their behavior accordingly. Social experimentation goes on without
respite. Competitive forces select more
successful behavior and enforce
* Professor of Economics, Department of’
Economics, University of Munich, Germany, e-mail: schlicht@lrz.uni-muenchen.de.
** Discussions with Eva Jahionka have been important in shaping the ideas presented
here. I thank Peter Weise
and an anonymous referee for penetrating comments.
33
it on the individuals. In the end, a social structure emerges from
this process of incessant mutual re-adjustment. This picture, drawn notably by theorists
dealing with social evolution, is, however, ambiguous. [1] It leaves the question
open as to whether the rules of custom grow out of experience, or whether
people experiment with alternative rules and select the best from the set. Both theoretical alternatives have been
pursued in the literature in a cursory fashion, and without expanding on
detail. I shall refer to the first view
as ‘rule inductivism’ and to the second as ‘rule
structuralism’. Neither view can give an
adequate account of rule formation and the processes underlying the
assimilation of customary behavioral patterns (Section 2 to 5).
A close examination of rule learning reveals that learning processes
are intimately tied up with evaluations of an aesthetic kind, relating to
formal features like symmetry, analogy, or good continuity. This observation leads to a third alternative,
rule-aestheticism, which takes the middle ground between inductivism
and structuralism. It offers a more
satisfactory account of the learning processes that channel social evolution
and is described in Sections 6 to 8.
The issue of rule learning will be discussed in a very simple setting. I shall concentrate almost exclusively on conventions,
which are rules that solve co-ordination problems and where it is best for each
individual to follow the convention if others do the same. Keeping on the right hand side of the road is
an example. Conventions, in contrast to
many other prescriptions of custom, do not pose enforcement problems. This permits concentration on fundamental aspects
of learning processes.
The processes of learning are of particular importance for the social
sciences because the way people learn influences their behavior and thereby
moulds the social regularities which are to be learned. In this sense, learning processes are of more
fundamental significance in the social sciences than, say, in physics, where a
physicist may neglect the fact that the way he thinks is part of physical
reality and that the aesthetic judgements involved in
generating his theories play any role in it.
We may allow that we would approach problems in physics differently if
we were endowed with another type of aesthetic sense, but we could still be
confident that the theories thus developed would describe the same physical
reality, and would amount, in this sense, to much the same as the theories we
currently entertain. With regard to
social structure, however, we must expect that another type of aesthetic sense
would have made us settle for quite different property or family structures. We would live in a different social world.
Let me consider learning first, and how people learn the rules of custom.
One view of rule formation posits that
rules are formed inductively from experience. Adam Smith envisaged the formation of the
rules of moral conduct in this manner:
1. Boyd/Richerson-1985.
34
Our continual observations upon the conduct of others,
insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what
is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided. It is thus that the general rules of morality
are formed. They are ultimately founded
upon our experience of what, in particular circumstances, our moral faculties,
our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn
particular actions; because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or
inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed,
by finding out from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or
circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of. [2]
A similar position may be found in modern game theory where it is
maintained that notions of fairness reflect and encode successful strategic
behavior as learnt, and adopted in a process of trial and error, with
successful behavior maintained, and unsuccessful behavior avoided. Successful behavior is summarized in terms of
rules. People follow these rules not
necessarily because they are aware of their usefulness, but for emotional or
moral reasons, yet these emotional or moral motives are only proximate causes
of behavior. The motives themselves have
been formed because they have generated successful behavior. [3]
According to rule inductivism, customs
incorporate the inductively derived and emotionally encoded recipes for
success. Analysis must penetrate the
surface phenomena of moral preferences and judgements
and zero in on the ultimate instrumental causes of customs. Any explanation of custom, it is maintained,
must start from there.
I would like to contrast the inductivist view sketched in the last section with another extreme view, labeled ‘rule structuralism’. This view can be described as follows. There is a set of possible rules like ‘you must not lie,’ ‘you must not steal,’ or ‘you must drive on the right-hand side of the road’. These rules are pre-fabricated ideas in a Platonic (or Kantian) ‘rule-heaven,’ given a priori. Humans select from this set by adopting certain rules, and rejecting others. The survival of certain rules, or certain rule-systems, can be analyzed again in competitive terms. The ‘better’ rules, or ‘better’ rule-systems, survive and supersede the others. Here ‘better’ means competitive dominance, or a faster spread of active rules within the population. The concept is akin to biological fitness.
2. Smith-1759, p. 159.
3. Binmore/Samuelson-1994, pp.
46-7.
4. The concept of structuralism
is introduced and used here in a very simple way, i.e. by
assuming that there is a set of pre-fabricated rules (structures) without any
finer distinction among them. This is
done in order to draw attention to the importance of making distinctions within
the set of structures, as will be elaborated in section 6 below. Current structuralist
positions in linguistics or the social sciences are, however, more refined and
do take some of these aspect into account.
35
In the following I shall, however, not discuss issues of propagation
and evolution of rule systems, but emphasize the crucial difference between rule
inductivism and rule structuralism: The former takes
rules as generated by competitive forces, the latter takes competition as
taking place between rules. These rules
must, therefore, precede competition.
The position of rule structuralism is shared by many theorists who
think about the choice of alternative rule-systems, related to constitutional
economics, or “Wirtschaftsordnungen”. [5] Some positions in modern
institutional economics may, in this sense, be classed as structuralist.
They characterize institutions as
‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction,’ and interpret them
as ‘rules’ which have been selected, or have emerged from competition. [6] Rule utilitarians
can be counted as structuralists, too. They insist that general rules, rather than
specific actions, are to be selected according to the results they bring about.
This excludes the option of piecewise
optimization.
4. A Critique of
Inductivism [7]
Rule inductivism holds that rules are formed
by induction from experience. This is,
however, a position that is difficult to maintain because rules cannot emerge
from rule-free or otherwise unaided induction. Obviously, induction requires ideas about how
inductive knowledge is generated. Processes
of induction can not be conceived as free-floating. They need an anchor.
Consider the following simple inference problem. An individual sets out to learn how to behave
at various traffic crossings. He finds
out that it is best to take action a under
circumstances A, action b under circumstances B, and
action c under circumstances C. Take the simple case of right of way in
traffic, and take circumstances A, B and C as referring to
particular crossings. The following
characterizations of actions a, b, and c may be conceived
a give right
of way to cars coming from the right at crossing A
b give right of way to cars coming from the
left at crossing B
c give right of way to boats crossing from
leeward at crossing C
The individual notes also that crossing A is one particular
crossing in Munich, crossing B is a crossing in London, and crossing C
is a certain crossing of waterways on a inlet of
the Baltic, near Kiel. Note that
formation of the underlying notions ‘right’, ‘left’, ‘windward,’ or ‘leeward’
relies on induction in the sense that these characterizations and
classifications must have been learned and that all individuals have adopted
the same classifications. Furthermore,
the individual must have learnt that the distinction windward-leeward is
irrelevant on the road, and the distinction right-left is irrelevant on the
waterway, and that a myriad of other possible
5. Buchanart/Brennan-1985, Buchanan-1994.
6. North-1990, p. 3.
7. For the following, see also Goodman-1983, pp. 59-83
and Schlicht-1998, pp. 87-105.
36
distinctions are irrelevant at all crossings. Usually, many other characteristics, like
north-south, or broad-narrow, may serve to co-ordinate action equally well. If each individual had tried to co-ordinate by
using another characteristic, the learning of co-ordination would have been
impossible. If one person tries to find
a right of way rule, based on the windward-leeward distinction, while his
partner concentrates on the right-left distinction, and a third individual
tries to co-ordinate by concentrating on yet another aspect, it will be
practically impossible for the group to co-ordinate successfully. Furthermore rule learning may involve
generalizations such as ‘in England, always give right of way to vehicles coming
from the left, but on the continent, give right of way to vehicles coming from
the right,’ and ‘stop to traffic from the leeward side on waterways’. Such generalizations rest on notions like
‘England’, ‘the continent’ or ‘waterways’. These, again, must be shared by the
individuals concerned and must precede any inductive learning of general rules.
All learning rests thus on classifications and distinctions. In order to learn co-ordination inductively,
the relevant classifications and distinctions used by the individuals concerned
must have been coordinated beforehand. The individuals must have settled
spontaneously for matching characteristics as coordinating devices, or must
have, at least, settled for a few possibilities such as right-left or windward-leeward
distinctions, in order to render learning possible. This set of alternatives can not be determined
inductively, because the vast number of theoretical possibilities would
frustrate any attempt to single out one particular distinction as being the
relevant one. A lifetime would not
suffice to gather the necessary information. [8]
Co-ordination can only emerge from mutually matching inductions drawn
by the individuals concerned, and from a correlated cognitive structuring of
experience. Ultimately, the possibility
to learn and co-ordinate in social interaction rests on cognitive dispositions
which are shared by the majority of individuals concerned. This fact is theoretically of great
significance, but has been neglected in many theoretical inquiries. It is all too natural, like breathing, and
does not stir up any attention. Yet, unlike
breathing, the way we make inductions shapes social interaction. It cannot be ignored.
The argument that all learning is rule-bound (which differs, however, from the position developed in this paper) has been of great importance in linguistics regarding the acquisition of language and the learning of grammar rules. It seems to be well established that young children learn language guided by an innate knowledge of the possible forms of natural language. Without language universals, learning would not be possible, as each new achievement is generalized in many ways beyond whatever has been experienced before. Language acquisition must be understood in structuralist, rather than behaviorist, terms. This seems to be a widely accepted view. The debate today concentrates on the question whether the universals underlying language acquisition reflect language-specific knowledge or
8. In linguistics, an analogous argument is used to
defend the postulate of a generative grammar.
Similar problems arise in biology with attempts to explain the evolution
of behavior, but are often ignored. (See for example
Maynard-Smith 1978).
37
general regularities of cognition. The idea of structuralist
learning itself remains unchallenged. [9]
5. A Critique of Structuralism
The learning of the rules of custom is in many ways very similar to the
learning of the rules of grammar. It
involves many generalizations. If, at a
certain crossing, we have learnt to give way to traffic coming from the right,
we will spontaneously and subliminally form the rule ‘right before left’ and
try this in other situations - at other crossings, on the sidewalks, etc. This type of generalization - that one
learning event triggers off an entire cluster of other behaviors - is akin to
the way we learn languages, and is essential for effective learning.
We have seen that inductivism cannot account
for effective rule learning. However, structuralism
cannot adequately elucidate rule-learning either. The simple dichotomy between rules and
non-rules is not sufficient to cope with learning unless the possibilities are
extremely and unrealistically limited.
To illustrate, consider the following four passing rules, which build
on the right-left categorization, but add a temporal dimension:
R1 always keep right
R2 always keep left
R3 keep right on odd days (Mondays, Wednesdays,
Fridays, and Sundays) and keep left on the other days of the week
R4 keep right on even days (Tuesdays, Thursdays,
and Saturdays) and keep left on the other days of the week
When trying to learn a passing rule, we start with simple hypotheses
like R1 or R2. If these do
not work, we may try refinements R3 or R4. We would not, however, start with rule R3
as a first approximation and then refine it by restricting it to odd days
and invoke rule R4 for the rest of the week, thereby effectively
reproducing rule R1 as a combination of rules R3 and R4. This would appear unnatural and unwieldy. Yet theoretically it would be a matter of
indifference whether we took R1 and R2 as our primitive rules,
and conceived R3 and R4 as refinements, or whether we started
from R3 and R4 and took R1 and R2 as refinements. If the only possible distinction refers to the
one between rules and non-rules, all rules are equivalent. There would be no hierarchy in the rule
heaven.
9. See Anderson-1980, p. 352. The position of aestheticism developed in this
paper could be applied to linguistics, too, and would then challenge certain
aspects of linguistic structuralism. See
also footnote 11 below.
38
Without a hierarchy, however, rule learning would not be realistically
possible. The following example may
clarify this thought. We consider the
issue of driving on the right versus driving on the left and allow for rules
that use distinctions of weekdays, just as rules R1 to R4 above
do. Many other possible rules exist that
build on the right-left distinction and on the classification of weekdays. All in all, 27 = 128 different
rules can be stated. Each such rule may
be described by a sequence of letters indicating the appropriate behavior on
the corresponding day of the week. Thus
we write R1=(r; r, r, r, r, r, r) or R4=(l, r,
1, r, 1, r, 1). If
we.allow for all possible rules, there would be no
way to learn by induction from the past. Each observation on one day would cut future
possibilities by half, because it would fix the choice of right or left for
that particular day, but would not carry any implication for the remaining days
of the week. Whatever had been observed
at the beginning of the week will, thus, not help to make predictions for the
remaining days.
Rule formation and rule learning will actually proceed differently. Assume that behavior of others has been
observed on the first five days of the week. On each of the first five days, we have
observed driving on the right. Our pre-conceived
ideas of simplicity, clarity and straightforwardness would suggest to us to
expect (r, r) for Saturday and:-Sunday, and we would
confidently assume that the others were guided by similar expectations. This would enable smooth co-ordination on
Saturday and Sunday, emerging from a generalization from past experience on the
preceding weekdays. We would, so to
speak, prefer the rule R1=(r, r, r, r, r, r, r) over the rule R5=(r,
r, r, r, r, 1, 1) when making inductions. Without ideas of simplicity, clarity, and
continuity, however, no such grading of rules would be possible. The rule R5 ‘drive on the right save on
Saturdays and Sundays’ is a possible rule, just as rule R1 ‘drive on the
right all the time’. Similar observations
apply to all possible combinations of driving on the right and driving on the
left.
We are, thus, able to learn from past experience, because we prefer
certain inductions to others, and we happily assume that such a rule preference
is a good guide for predictions about the future. [10]
Note that the induction problem has been discussed above in a very
simple setting, assuming that other facts had been learnt before. For instance, it has
been assumed that a ‘week’ is the relevant time period to consider, and that
other than right-left categories do not matter. In a more realistic setting, the problem of
determining which rule is best becomes practically insoluble.
It would be thus of no great help to restrict the set of rules to a subset, as rule structuralism would suggest. If we knew a priori that you should keep at the same side of the road on Saturdays and Sundays, this would no doubt restrict the set of possibilities by half. We would not need to learn about Sundays. However,
10. See Schlicht-1998, Ch. 8. The argument relates closely to Goodman’s
contention (Goodman-1983). He points out
that unaided induction is impossible, and proposes the view that the
categorizations given in language serve this purpose in a similar vein, and
starting from the same problem, Goyal and Jarissen propose that learning of conventions presupposes
some other conventions (Goyal/Janssen-1996). The argument presented here would trace the
emergence of these categorizations and conventions to clarity judgements of an aesthetic kind, ultimately prompted by our
psychological make-up.
39
in order to render rule learning possible, the set of
alternatives would have to be narrowed down drastically. Such, a trimming of the rule heaven would be
entirely unjustified on a priori grounds. [11] Every sequence of right
and left could serve as a possible rule for coordinating passing on the road. It is only that some rules are considered
better than others, in a purely aesthetic, non-instrumental sense. This induces us to try them out first. The position of structuralism ignores this
fact and postulates, erroneously, that a clear-cut distinction can be drawn
‘between rules and non-rules. ‘
Rules cannot be derived from unaided induction. Thus, inductivism,
as conceived above, is an untenable position. Similarly, structuralism, as conceived above,
cannot account for rule learning and rule formation, as it rests on an
untenable categorical distinction between rules and non-rules. The examples given above suggest, however, an
intermediate position that avoids both extremes and, at the same time, can
account very naturally for rule formation and rule learning. This is the position of rule aestheticism,
which will be described presently.
The basic observation here is that rules can be graded not only with
respect to their instrumental usefulness, but also with respect to their
clarity, straightforwardness, and ease of perception and reproduction. Some rules are better than others, in this
sense. For the purpose of learning,
induction, and transmission, individuals prefer more attractive to less
attractive rules. They have a rule
preference. This renders it possible to
learn from the past.
Rule preference is of an essentially aesthetic nature. Symmetry, simplicity, straightforwardness,
analogy, and other formal features contribute to distinguish a good rule from a
bad one. The clarity of a rule is,
however, not a number that can simply be attached to it or springs from a
calculation of the clarity values of its components. Just like beauty “is not in any of the parts
or members of a pillar, but results from the whole,” the beauty or
attractiveness of a rule depends on its overall pattern, and how well it fits
in with other rules in the prevailing set of customs. [12]
This would show up empirically if we tried to measure the clarity of a
rule by noting what types of rules people prefer and try out first. The rule of walking on the right on the
sidewalk will appear more attractive on the continent than in Great Britain,
because it would harmonize with the rules prevailing on the continent, not in
Britain. Likewise, the rule to drive on
the right on weekdays and on the left on Sundays would appear better than the
rule to drive on the left on every other tenth
11. The argument could also be advanced against
structural linguistics: There is no clear-cut distinction to be drawn between correct
and incorrect sentences. Some sentences
are clear, some are murky, some verge on being wrong, and some are definitely
wrong from a grammatical point of view.
12. Hume-1777, p. 292. Let me note that the clarity preference is not
to be equated to a preference for simplicity, see Schlicht-1998, p. 136.
40
day and on the right otherwise. This depends entirely on the prevailing
convention of having a seven-day week, rather than a ten-day-week.
Aesthetic judgements, if
shared by the individuals concerned, render it possible to solve the pervasive
induction problem. Rule detection
becomes possible because the ‘better’ rules are tried first, and modifications
may only be introduced later if necessary.
This procedure is well illustrated in econometrics, where we start by
assuming linear relations first. If we
allowed for polynomials of arbitrary degree from the outset, there would be
infinitely many which would fit our data perfectly, but there would be no way
to decide which of these polynomials to choose. By assuming simple relationships first, and
introducing modifications when needed, we can obtain our results. [13]
Both the inductivist and the structuralist approach can be refined and shifted to more
fundamental aspects of learning. This
gives rise to sophisticated inductivism on the
one hand, and sophisticated structuralism on the other.
Sophisticated inductivism.
It may be argued that the rules are
formed by inductive processes on a higher level. What appears ‘simple’ or ‘clear’ to us is
not simple or clear in any objective sense but is perceived as thus because it
is advantageous to form this, and no other, notion of simplicity and clarity. Evolution has taught us to form such notions
in the most expedient way. This argument
points to a theoretical possibility but seems to me to be of limited bearing,
at least in the context of the social sciences. We can safely assume that the fundamental
processes of learning and behavior, which characterize humans, and are shared
by many animals, are invariant in historical time. We can take mental structure as given.
On a pragmatic level, psychologists have addressed the
issue of induction vs. pre-determined structure in concept formation. The inductivist
position was that a concept - say, of a bird - refers to an average specimen
which we most frequently
13. This is the well-known identification problem in
econometrics. If arbitrary functional
forms are permitted for a regression equation, there will be infinitely
possibilities to obtain a perfect fit for the past, with arbitrarily many
associated predictions for the future. The problem is solved in econometrics by
trying ‘simple’ functional forms (like straight lines, quadratic or logarithmic
functions) first. It is to be noted here
that this is not simply a matter of the number of parameters involved, although
the problem is usually discussed in this way. It is true that a linear equation y = a + bx involves only the two parameters a and b, but
this holds true for [HHC – equation not reproduced] … as well , and infinitely many other two-parameter functions are
conceivable. In particular, for each set
of observations (xt,
yt) t = 1, 2, … T and any prediction (xt, yt) t = T+1, T+2,… T+z
there will exist infinitely many polynomials y = a + b.P(x)
which will yield a prefect fit. Estimating
the equation y = a+b.P(x) will give the
estimates a = 0 and b = 1 but this kind of perfect regression will
tell us nothing about predictions because we can obtain all predictions we like
in this way.
41
encounter, and we form the concept of a bird that fits best
in most cases. The other alternative was
that abstract features such as symmetry and clarity rather than frequent
exposure or other practical concerns govern concept formation. It turns out that such abstract features and,
in particular, the context in which observations, occur, are very important for
concept formation. [14] This
is also evident in our, everyday experience with the decimal system. The most prominent numbers here are 1, 10,
100, etc., but these are not the numbers we use most frequently. In the sexagesimal
system which we use with timepieces, the numbers 60, 120, 180 and 240 are prominent. Such clarity judgements
are driven by the number system in the first place, rather than by frequent,
exposure. Sometimes, frequent exposure
is the result of, rather than the cause for, clarity features. We have, for example, television films which
fit into 60 minute time-slots, and videotapes which are gauged to this rhythm.
Sophisticated stnicturalism.
The observation that mental
structure must be taken as fixed and given in historical time may suggest,
again, a structural view of a more refined kind. Sophisticated structuralism forms its
beginning from the idea that rule learning is rule-bound itself. Thus, it may be urged, there must be rules for
learning rules. The ‘deep’ rules are
genetically determined. They enable us
to learn and to make inductions. This
kind of structuralism could be developed in full analogy with linguistic
structuralism. In linguistic
structuralism, it is maintained that children are genetically equipped with a,
‘generative’ grammar which enables them to learn any language which happens to
be spoken by their caretakers in an extremely efficient manner. The generative grammar is, thus, a set of
rules for making rules. If applied in
full analogy to the social sciences this kind of structuralism would maintain
that humans are equipped with a ‘generative social structure’ which produces,
in interaction with prevailing circumstances and historical conditions, any
social structure we may observe. [15]
Sophisticated structuralism need not be conceived in such a modular
manner, however. Just as cognitive
dispositions enabling language acquisition may not be language specific the cognitive
dispositions enabling the learning of the rules of social interaction may be of
a general nature, rather than specific to social interaction. We need neither postulate a separate language
module nor assume a separate social module in our cognitive organization, as
both language acquisition and social learning phenomena may stem from a general
ability to learn rules.
8. Structuralism and Aestheticism
Structuralism, in its sophisticated non-modular version, distinguishes
between a generative structure, genetically given, and the realized social
structure
14. See Anderson-1990, pp. 137-145 and Schlicht-1998,
pp. 75-86 for further discussion.
15. This would be one reading of Aristotele’s
‘hexis’ or Pirker’s and Rauchenschwandtner’s ‘sense of community’, see Pirker/Rauchenschwandtner-1998,
pp. 410-11.
42
or a rule system which we actually observe. A set of generative rules constitutes the
‘deep structure’. It generates, in
interaction with prevailing social and historical conditions, the particular
rule systems we observe in different societies.
In contrast, aestheticism places great emphasis on the necessity of grading
possible rules according to clarity and straightforwardness. It has been urged that a non-instrumental, or
aesthetic, preference for clear rules must be presupposed. This rule preference induces people to try the
clear rules first. This makes induction
and rule learning possible. However, the
grading of rules according to clarity has been described without referring to
the different layers of rules such as deep generative and superficial actual
rules. In this, the proposed view of
rule learning deviates from structuralism. The position seems preferable for purposes of
social analysis, as a distinction between different layers of rules is neither
necessary nor simplifying. Furthermore,
it is not obvious that a categorical distinction can usefully be made between
generative and actual rules, as it seems that any rule, once adopted, may serve
to generate other rules.
This is partially a semantic issue. Consider the case of rules to keep to one side
on the footpath and on the Street. Let (r,
1) denote the case that you keep to the right on the footpath and to the
left on the street. Assume a society
with footpaths, but no streets, and where the rule was established to keep to
the right on the footpath. With the
introduction of carriages and carts, the necessity arose for streets and a rule
for their use. The alternatives were, to
select either (r, r) or (r, 1) as a rule system. Rule preference would suggest the first
alternative. Hence the previously
established rule ‘Keep to the right on the footpath’ entails the derived rule
‘keep to the right on the street’. In
this sense, the first rule helped to generate the second. More generally, any rule can serve as a
generative rule in so far as clarity judgements
depend on context, and any rule can serve as an element in the context for the
establishment of another rule. In this sense,
a distinction between generative and superficial rules seems unwarranted.
We may phrase the same reasoning in terms of generative rules, however. The prescription: “keep to the same side on
the footpath and on the street’ may be considered a generative rule in this
case. As a matter of semantics, we may,
in this vein, conceive that any principle which establishes a preference for a
certain rule over another one, is a generative rule.
But semantic choices are rarely innocuous, as they ease certain types of arguments and impair others. In this sense, the semantic choice of distinguishing between generative and superficial structures seems unfortunate. This becomes evident in the cases where simplicity judgements and analogies are important. The rule ‘go for simple rules’ presupposes simplicity judgements, which could, in principle, be stated by some rules that describe the processes generating such judgements. These could then be taken as generative rules. In a similar vein, the rule ‘treat similar cases analogously’ can be traced to some generative rules which describe the way we form similarity judgements and analogies. Such a parlance in terms of generative structures seems unnecessarily cumbersome, however. It may be preferable to point directly to the types of judgement on which rule formation builds. These processes have been described here as ‘aesthetic,’ in the sense of involving judgements about clarity, similarity, analogy, and coherence. The alternative of phrasing these judgements in terms of the processes which generate
43
them tends to overemphasize the algorithmic aspect of rule
formation and thereby obscure the all-important judgmental aspect. [16]
Furthermore, the reduction of judgements to
the processes underlying them may render the argument unnecessarily prolix,
possibly up to the point where the straightforward judgmental processes
involved in rule formation become buried in a heap of conjectures about
psychological processes which are largely irrelevant to rule formation. If we look at a mathematical theorem, for
instance, we can undoubtedly identify its truth with the proof given for the
theorem, and the rules that govern the relevant reasoning. Yet there are many different proofs
conceivable for any given theorem, and we may conceive the truth thereof as
independent of the proofing procedure, as all different proofs give the same
result. There are many ways, for
instance, to prove Pythagoras theorem, both geometrically and algebraically. The truth of the theorem is independent of the
particular proof chosen. When we apply
the theorem, we suppose that it is true, without reference to any particular
method of proof. To insist on
reconsidering the proof over and over again would curb the usefulness of
Pythagoras’ theorem considerably. The
theorem is useful because we can take it as given - without the underlying
processes of proving it again and again.
In a similar vein, we may approach rule formation as a process which is
driven by aesthetic judgement, without necessarily
enlarging on how these aesthetic judgements
themselves come about. In this sense,
the aesthetic approach offers a shortcut which side-steps some issues in
evolutionary psychology. The question
of how aesthetic judgements are generated is largely
irrelevant to the issue of rule formation. It suffices that these judgements
are made, and are prompted by human psychological propensities that can be
safely assumed as given and invariable in historical time
This shortcut seems appropriate because the question about the
formation of aesthetic judgement is fundamental, very
difficult, and remains largely unresolved in evolutionary theory. Darwin himself emphasized the difficulty of
accepting that mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish share the “high taste of
beauty” which “generally coincides with our own standard”. [17] Yet, according to him
aesthetic taste must be presupposed if we want to understand, for example, the
phenomena of the peacock’s tail-feathers or other significant features of
animals in evolutionary terms. He
invokes the idea that this sharing of aesthetic judgements
across species may relate to the idea of common descent of all vertebrates, and
that “the nerve-cells of the brain in the highest, as well as in the lowest
members of the Vertebrate series, are derived from those of the common progenitor
of this great Kingdom.” The range of
shared aesthetic judgements required for the present
purpose is much more restricted, and less demanding, as it relates to humans
only, and need not apply across species. In view of Darwin’s observation on the role of
beauty in evolution it would, however, be entirely mistaken to reject the
relevance of aesthetic judgements in social
co-ordination on evolutionary grounds. The argument that we know very little about
the inner mechanisms of the aesthetic
16. This would be, in the terminology of
Kubon-Gilke/Schlicht-1993, pp. 259-60, a ‘conceptual implication’ of the structuralist parlance.
17. Darwin-1874, p. 640.
44
sense does not imply that aesthetic judgements
are irrelevant to biological and social evolution. Quite to the contrary: The fact that aesthetic
judgements are made and widely shared offers a prima facie reason for assuming that
they are evolutionarily significant. The
importance of aesthetic judgement in learning
processes offers further, an avenue of thought which may help us to understand
what Darwin took as a fact: That we are endowed with an aesthetic sense.
From a biologist’s point of view, learning is interpreted as adaptive
responses brought about by selective pressure. Learning is just a special case of adaptation.. It involves the
gathering and transmission of information.
In this sense, evolution is a process of learning. We may envisage different levels of
adaptation: the genetic the individual, and the social level. Let us consider these in turn. [18]
1 Genetic learning The
process of biological evolution is typically envisaged as brought about by
variation and selection. Genetic mutation
and recombination generate variation. While
well adapted individuals survive and multiply, the less well adapted are pruned
off in the struggle for survival. Furthermore, the speed, and direction of
mutations is controlled by genetic mechanisms, which have evolved in the same
manner. This gives rise to directed or
patterned, rather than random mutation. [19]
2. Individual learning. However, not all organisms function like genetically programmed automata. In changing environments, genetic adaptation is sometimes too slow to track change. So some species have acquired the ability to learn and thereby to adapt more quickly. [20] This type of learning depends on recognizing
18. Selten-1991,
Jablonka/Lachrnann/Lamb-1992, Lachmann/Jablonka-1996, and Jablonka/Lamb/Avital-1998
inspire the considerations in this section. Selten-1991, p. 21 distinguishes mutation,
changes in gene frequencies (which I lump together), cultural transmission, and
individual learning and stresses the different time dimensions involved. Jablonka, Lamb, and Avital distinguish, however, four inheritance systems: the
epigenetic inheritance system, the genetic inheritance system, the behavioral
inheritance system, and the linguistic inheritance system. The above classification amalgamates their epigentic and genetic inheritance systems. Further, as I am interested not only in
inheritance, but more generally in learning, I distinguish here individual
learning and social learning, which replaces their behavioral and linguistic
systems to some measure. The fundamental
argument introduced by Jablonka et al., namely, that the different systems
have their particular advantages under different conditions and will be
selected for accordingly, is maintained.
19. “Some genetic structures do
not adapt the organism to its environment. Instead, they have evolved to promote and
direct the process of evolution. They
function to enhance the capacity of the species to evolve.” (Campbell-1985, p. 137).
Thus, evolutionary processes of
variation must be assumed to be structured and patterned, rather than random
and diffuse, see Jablonka/Lamb-1995: chs. 3-5 and, with respect to social theory, Schlicht-1997.
20. By the way, this
observation puts into question a central tenet of evolutionary psychology,
namely that evolution would favor domain-specific rather than general solutions
in learning. The argument is that
task-specific optimization is better at each task than any general strategy
which could be applied to many tasks. (The
issue of act-utilitarianism versus rule-utilitarianism re-appears here in a
different guise.) The counter argument
is that repeated task must be expected being automated and even genetically
assimilated anyway. The raison d’être
of learning is, thus, to cope with new issues in the best possible way, but
there will be no chance for full optimization. See Shapiro/Epstein-1998 for related
discussion.
45
recurrent patterns, identifying similar cases and forming
hypotheses in the most efficient way. Learning relies on the “supposition that the
future resembles the past”. [21] Yet
our ideas of resemblance must be prompted by correlations in the environment. [22] They cannot be
fine-tuned to any one particular case because they constantly have to deal with
new ones. This type of learning has
proved successful, and has evolved, just as directed variation has superseded
random mutation at the genetic level for evolutionary reasons.
3. Social learning. Genetic
adaptation can be expected to occur in environments that remain invariant over
time. Learning at an individual level
can be expected to occur within environments that incessantly present new
challenges to the individual. On an
intermediate time-scale we can imagine changes which can neither be tracked by
genetic change nor by individual learning in any satisfactory way. Let us envisage changes that occur over
approximately a hundred generations. This
time-span is too short to allow for significant genetic adaptation, but long
enough to make it a waste of resources if each individual had to learn anew
about the environment. Under such circumstances,
it is more efficient for the individual simply to copy the behavior of others,
rather than to find out about the environment on his own. This is when social learning evolves, and
social tradition forms. In this social
context learning relies on pattern recognition. However, the individual will be concerned with
detecting patterns in the behavior of its conspecifics,
rather than learning about the natural environment directly, which would be
more costly. Once the customary behavioral
patterns are assimilated, the individual may, through individual learning,
improve on them and transmit improved behaviors to the next generation. This process gives rise to social evolution. [23]
10. Selecting for Rule
Preference
Learning, whether social or individual, is concerned with recognizing
regularities and recurrent patterns. These
patterns, once recognized, help in guiding the individual’s future behavior and
eliminating that which is likely to fail. Learning prevents certain behaviors from being
tried out. This strategy is certainly
not the best, as it would be better to select the optimum solution in each
specific case, but this is unrealistic; otherwise genetic encoding would have
succeeded in producing such a response by now. The importance of an aesthetic sense to
21. Hume-1740, p. 134.
22. This is the theme in Lorenz-1973.
23. See Cavallj-Sforza/Feldman-1981,
Boyd/Richerson-1985. As the theoretical
argument suggests, processes of social learning and social evolution are not
restricted to humans but widespread in the animal kingdom, and give rise to a
host of animal cultures and animal traditions; see Avital
and Jablonka (in preparation).
46
enabling learning offers an argument for why we find
individuals endowed with aesthetic preferences. [24] But we can go further.
Learning relates to novelty, and to detecting newly occurring patterns.
In order to detect these, the individual
must be interested in finding such patterns. Without an active interest in observing
resemblances, analogies, and regularities spanning certain categories, they
would go undetected. Take two
individuals: One is interested in finding patterns, the other is not. In every other respect, both individuals are
absolutely identical. Assume further
that the environment is such that fitness can be increased by learning, either
because it enables individuals to benefit by assimilating the knowledge encoded
in the culture they live in, or by exploiting some idiosyncratic features of
their particular habitat more effectively. Under these circumstances we must assume that
an active desire for pattern recognition will increase fitness. The more curious individual - the one who
likes and enjoys detecting patterns, similarities, arid analogies - will be
more successful than the disinterested one. In this way, we must assume natural selection
to mould a sense of beauty, and an active desire to uncover patterns. Just as we are endowed with
a preference for nutritious food. [25]
As an aside, let me note that many inorganic things strike us as
beautiful: crystals, rocks, a rainbow, the shapes of clouds, a
waterfall in the sun. That we perceive
these structures as beautiful indicates that our sense of beauty is tuned to
such things, and there is a selective value in having such a taste. Furthermore, many aspects of beauty in
animals, like the leopard’s spots, have been traced back to the nature of
physical and chemical processes, which severely channel and constrain both
natural and sexual selection. [26] This
strengthens, again, the point that aesthetic judgements
are not arbitrary but reflect the structure of the universe in a deep sense for
reasons we cannot easily understand.
This is highlighted also by the observation that the power of aesthetic judgements in uncovering the laws of nature is absolutely stunning. The physicist Paul Dirac was prompted by aesthetic reasons to reformulate an equation for the electron, which then led to the successful prediction of antimatter. He thought that it is more important to have beauty in one’s equations than to have them fit the experiment. [27] In a similar vein, the physicist Roger Penrose holds that “rigorous
24. Proponents of focal point
arguments, like Schelling-1969 and Sugden-1986 rely in this sense on aesthetic judgement, but do not relate this to an aesthetic
preference which is central for my own theory (Schlicht-1998).
25. This argument has its
limits, because curiosity and playfulness come at the cost of wasting time. We may, thus, postulate that evolution has
settled for an appropriate level of such endeavors. Further, the above argument assumes that the
desire to uncover and enjoy patterns is what we call the sense of beauty.
26. Goodwin-1994. Note that these arguments differ: The fact
that inorganic patterns strike us as beautiful can be interpreted in two
different ways. One possibility (emphasized
by Lorenz-1973) is that our aesthetic judgement has
evolved because the physical world has properties that selected for
correspondence between perception, cognition, and aspects of non-organic
reality. The other possibility is that
internal constraints such as those emerging from the way our nervous system is organized, provide the anchor for our aesthetic sense. For our present purposes we need not opt for
one alternative or the other; and both may interact.
27. Davies-1992, p. 176.
47
argument is usually the last step! Before that, one has to make many guesses, and
for these, aesthetic convictions are enormously important.” [28] It has been noted that
there is something curious here. If
beauty is entirely biologically programmed, selected for survival value alone,
it is all the more surprising to see it re-emerge in the esoteric world of
fundamental physics, which has no direct connection with biology. On the other hand, if beauty is more than mere
biology at work, if our aesthetic appreciation stems from contact with
something firmer and more pervasive, then it is surely a fact of major
significance that the fundamental laws of the universe reflect this
“something”. [29]
This was just an aside to illustrate the astonishing power of aesthetic
considerations in theory formation. We
are not concerned here with these deep issues, but rather with everyday
learning phenomena which build, however, on the same tendencies of thinking
which guide the physicist in solving the riddles of the universe.
The point made in this paper is that aesthetic judgements
and an associated active desire to uncover, maintain, and expand regularities
is the source of rule formation in social interaction. The argument can he briefly restated as
follows: All learning and extrapolation presupposes aesthetic judgements concerning, similarity, analogy, simplicity, and
straightforwardness. Learning has
evolved as a response to changing environments, where genetic adaptation is too
slow. It is,
28. Davies 1992 p 177. I must be added here that Einstein placed
great emphasis on the truly religious conviction that this universe of ours is
something perfect and susceptible to the rational striving for knowledge. Here perfection cannot refer to purpose and
must be thus taken as a judgement of an aesthetic
kind. Einstein remarks that the search
for perfection is of importance for the development of science: “If this
conviction had not been a strongly emotional one and if those searching for knowledge
had not been inspired by Spinoza’s Amor Dei
InteI1ectualis, they would
hardly have been capable of that untiring devotion which alone enables man to
attain his greatest achievements.” (Einstein-1954, p. 52)
29. Davies-1992, p. 176. Note, however, that Darwin took beauty not so
much as biologically programmed, but rather as programming biological
selection, and in particular sexual selection. This contrasts with modern treatments like
Barrow’s (Barrow-1995) which speculate that the human, sense of beauty is
shaped by the neolithic conditions our ancestors were
exposed to. According to this argument,
we like savannah-type landscapes because these provided the most comfortable
environment for our Neolithic ancestors (Barrow-1995, p. 92; see also
Richter-1999). Such arguments fall short
of explaining why a polar landscape strikes us as beautiful and, more
importantly, it does not address the universal aspects of beauty judgements which were Darwin’s central concern.
The thought
that learning presupposes an aesthetic sense may contribute to approach the
issue in a Darwinian spirit. If the
sense of beauty were fully adaptive, the pea-hen would prefer males with
shorter tails for fitness reasons. This
rules out the adaptive explanations mentioned above. If the aesthetic sense is shaped with respect
to the efficacy of learning processes, however, it may entail those
inefficiencies in sexual selection Darwin was concerned with (Darwin-1874). Our sense of beauty would then be adaptive
with respect to learning, but would imply inefficiencies in other dimensions,
like the peacock’s tail.
48
however, not a passive phenomenon as it becomes particularly
effective if the individual tries to actively uncover and exploit regularities in
its environment. Hence evolutionary
forces have instilled a rule preference - a desire to uncover, maintain, and
expand patterns - as part ,and parcel of human nature.
This rule preference gives rise to rule
formation in social interaction. The
argument provides, thus, an evolutionary underpinning for the ‘clarity’ view of
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51
The Competitiveness of Nations
in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy
February 2004