The Competitiveness of Nations in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy
Michael
Polanyi
Scientific Outlook:
Its Sickness and Cure
Science, New Series, 125 (3246)
March 15, 1957, 480-484.
|
Content |
In the days when an idea could be silenced by showing
that it was contrary to
religion, theology, was the greatest single source of
fallacies. Today, when any human thought
can be discredited by branding it as unscientific, the power exercised
previously by theology has passed over to science; hence, science has become in
its turn the greatest single source of error.
In saying this I am not rebelling against the
preponderant influence of science on modern thought. No, I support it. But I am convinced that the abuses of the
scientific method must be checked, both in the interest of other human ideals
which they threaten and in the interest of science itself, which is menaced by
self-destruction, unless it can be attuned to the whole range of human thought.
Lest these opening words sound vague and exaggerated,
I shall nail down their demonstration forthwith by one name of two syllables:
by the name of Lenin. The voluminous
writings of Marx may point in various directions; the unspeakable deeds of
Stalin are bordering on the pathological; but Lenin’s doctrine is fairly clear
and consistent. Let me show that the
intellectual power by which it so widely triumphed both over its rivals and
opponents was its claim to scientific certainty.
R. B. MacLeod has drawn a line directly from Newton to
Bentham, and thence to modern sociology
[1]. This
line is indeed the very axis of modern social theory. But the Newtonian outlook, as prefigured by
Galileo and Gassendi, had established - by the work
of Hobbes - a mighty bridgehead in political thought, even before the advent of
Newton. In his Leviathan Hobbes
founded for the first time a theory of society on the utter selfishness of its
members, and his genius already foreshadowed there the monstrous tyranny that
this conception of society may justify. On the other hand, MacLeod’s axis should also
be extended forward beyond Bentham, directly to Marx
and Lenin. Dialectical materialism is a
radically utilitarian conception of a progressive society that is advancing
through conflict. It sees history moving
inevitably toward greater productivity and regards this movement as the result
of the rise of new classes over the dead bodies of obsolete social systems. It claims also that each new revolution of this
kind is accompanied by comprehensive changes in law and morality, in philosophy
and the arts, and, indeed, in every branch of human thought. This inexorable historic process bears the features
of a new leviathan. It is the leviathan of
Hobbes equipped with jet propulsion. Its
driving force is supplied by a fierce demand for social justice - but these
moral motives remain curiously concealed inside the monster.
Herein lies a characteristic
feature of all Marxist theory and Marxist policy: moral passions are masked as
scientific laws which, by defining a historic necessity, sanction the machinery
of violence which fulfills the necessity. Engels said that
Marxism had transformed socialism from a utopia into a science. But actually, Marxism still relies on the
emotional force of its utopian aspirations and
The author is professor of social studies (formerly
professor of physical chemistry) at Manchester University, Manchester, England.
This article is based on the fourth
paper presented during a symposium on “Fundamental units and concepts of
science” that was held 27-28 Dec. l956 during the New York meeting of the AAAS.
merely disguises them as scientific predictions.
It is important to understand this peculiar structure.
The scientific disguise provided by
Marxism not only protects its moral aspirations from being discredited as mere
utopianism but actually enables these aspirations to dominate from inside the
pronouncements of Marxist theory and thus to direct its political machinery. Marxism establishes thereby a coupling between
moral motives and political action, which is the exact opposite of that usually
described as rationalization. There
is no question here of concealing greed behind moral pretenses. Quite the contrary: genuine moral motives are
given a chance to operate by concealing them within a scientifically respectable
machinery of acquisitive violence.
I regard this as the ultimate stage of utilitarianism.
Bentham
justified morality by its usefulness. Marx
agreed but changed the emphasis by saying: Morality is nothing but a
disguise for greed. All sheep, he
said, are but wolves in sheep’s clothing. Bourgeois morality is the sheepskin for capitalist
wolves to hide in; wolfishness is the real objective force in history. Marx despised socialists like Fourier and
Owen, who appealed to the noble sentiments of the ruling classes, for in his
view they were but sheep appealing to wolves. I would agree that Marx effectively superseded
the utopians by his allegedly scientific socialism, but I would add that this
scientific socialism was merely a disguised utopianism rendered scientifically
acceptable by being cast for the part of a wolf - the wolf of merciless class war.
The moral passion of utopianism lived on
within the wolf, its hunger for righteousness being transformed into the
rapacity of the wolf. Such is the
Marxian leviathan.
This is how the curious structure was formed - fatefully
characteristic of our age - of high moral motives disguised as scientific
predictions, and secretly injected into the engines of merciless power. This is moral man’s flight into captivity, a
process which I have described elsewhere as a “moral inversion”
[2].
However, it might be objected that Marx, or his executors,
did not really proceed scientifically, the very fact that they became such
fanatics being proof that they did not preserve their scientific detachment.
But then, what about Bentham?
Bentham, whom
MacLeod rightly acknowledges as the very fountainhead of a “Newtonian” social
theory? From his utilitarianism flowed
the most powerful intellectual force for the reforms which changed the face of
England during the first four decades of the 19th century. This shows that Bentham,
like Marx, used his scientific analysis of society as a disguise for his moral
aspirations.
The progression from Bentham
to Marx was due mainly to the intensification of the moral demands made on society
in the course of the French Revolution and of the subsequent rise of Utopian
Socialism. The moral dynamism of the
19th century had to be cast into a more violent conception of historical
progress than that which could satisfy the reformers of the 18th century. There is a parallel progression in the development
of nihilism. Bentham’s
contemporary, the Marquis de Sade, reacted to the
mechanistic conception of man by a sweeping contempt for all morality, expressed
by devoting his life to the practice and his writings to the apologia of sexual
debaucheries. By contrast, the Russian
nihilists of the mid-19th century, guided by the same
supposedly scientific view of man - and deriving from it the same contempt for
all accepted morality - turned this contempt into a hatred of all existing
society and thence into a total dedication of themselves to the task of a
merciless social revolution. This is why
the doctrine of totalitarian: terror, which was not prevalent in the Western
interpretation of Marxism, was unhesitatingly proclaimed by Lenin as the true
teaching of Marx. He responded to the
example of Russian nihilism.
Thus it would seem that for better or for worse - for
better in Bentham, for worse in Lenin - the
supposedly detached analysis of morality always comes out heavily charged with
moral, immoral, or “morally inverted” impulses. And I think this has a simple explanation
which confirms MacLeod’s apprehensions concerning the “Newtonian” study of
human beings.
For surely, there are a great number of things our
knowledge of which dissolves if we look at them in a thoroughly detached
manner. The meaning of a word vanishes
if I cease to mean anything by it; the proof of a mathematical theorem
dissolves if I cease to trust it; and, likewise, a moral ideal dissolves if I
stop respecting it. I cannot know that
someone, say Lincoln or Gandhi, was a great man unless I revere him. You need reverence to observe human greatness,
just as you require a telescope to observe spiral nebulae. But reverence is not an objective approach in
the tradition of Newton, and hence our ideals - along with the greatness of men
who embody these ideals - must cease to be visible if they are approached
objectively in this Newtonian sense.
From this moment a process of moral inversion sets in. For once the frank expressions of our moral
passions are discredited by a detached scientific approach,
they will seek some outlet which is protected against our scientific
self-doubt. The various forms of
scientifically denatured morality which have emerged during the past two
centuries are but different outlets for frustrated moral passions. These passions may break out in an abject sensualism a la Sade, culminating
in frenzied destruction, for only such Satanism may appear completely honest and
entirely safe from any suspicion of bad faith. Many threads of this Satanism are found woven
into modern Continental thought, and they are prominent in modern French
existentialism.
The English-speaking peoples favored less radical
methods for rehousing the moral passions rendered
homeless by the scientific outlook. Following
Bentham’s guidance, they endowed some relatively
neutral vocabulary, like that of utility, or social adjustment, or mental
health, and so on, with the meaning of the moral terms for which they were to
serve as scientifically respectable substitutes. This pretense safeguarded good sense and benevolence
under inadequate scientific designations, and thus allowed moral passions to
operate effectively by stealth.
Yet though the draping of moral life in the terms of a
nonmoral language can protect moral ideals against
destruction by scientific analysis, such a situation might finally prove
unstable. Men may not pursue their moral
ideals indefinitely within a conceptual framework which denies reality to them.
Not because they will become indifferent
to morality - which is rare - but because they may slip into the logically more
stable state of complete moral inversion. A great upsurge of moral passions is likely to
cause a break-through in this direction. This is what happened, as we have seen, under
the impact of modern dynamism in the totalitarian revolutions of our time over
immense areas of Europe and Asia.
However, am I not neglecting the social sciences in
the academic sense, which MacLeod had primarily in mind in voicing his
apprehensions? Not quite - for my survey
of the contemporary scene has prepared my criticism of academic sociology and
social anthropology. It has reminded us
that all the live issues of our tumultuous age originated from the upsurge of a
new moral dynamism. And it has exposed
thereby the incongruity of adopting at this moment, as modern social
anthropology has done, a strictly detached observation of society.
I am referring to the prevailing functionalist method in social anthropology.
481
This approach
regards any institution, custom, or idea as fulfilling its function to the
extent to which it contributes to the stability and coherence of the existing
society. No matter how cruel, treacherous,
or abysmally stupid a custom may be, it will be
presumed to fulfill a social function in this sense. For example, the butchery of innocent people
on the charge of witchcraft is said to solve the problem of satisfying hate,
while keeping the core of society intact
[3].
The head-hunting of the Eddystone islanders is said to have kept their economic
system functioning [4]. Such views, though highly speculative, may be
true and even interesting within the framework that they set to themselves. But at the same time, this approach produces a
set of terms in which the most important distinctions are eliminated. It replaces morality by conformity; if an
action falls short of conformity it is a “maladjustment”
or a “deviance.” Pickpockets and
prophets, Hitler and Gandhi, Jesus of Nazareth and Judas Iscariot, are all
classed together as deviants; a functionalist anthropology cannot distinguish
between them.
At least it could not do so if it were strictly
consistent. For admittedly, some moral
sentiments are allowed to break through in the disguise of certain supposedly
descriptive terms: terms like aggressiveness or competitiveness or
authoritarian personality. Sociologists
join forces here with psychiatrists in disguising their condemnation of social
wrongs as the diagnosis of a mental disease. Thus, 20 years ago when Hitler’s rise fatally
challenged our courage and intelligence, a whole literature of analytic
treatises poured forth, propounding that wars were the result of pathological
aggressiveness, caused mainly by training infants too soon to cleanliness
[5]. This
literature may sound foolish today, but it is not mentioned here in order to
make fun of its authors. It should demonstrate,
on the contrary, that even the most distinguished minds can produce nothing
truly relevant to human affairs if they restrict themselves by the kind of
detachment which is currently supposed to be the mark of scientific integrity.
In his recent Josiah Mason lectures, Sprott pleads that since man has been studied for so long
in the past it is “no wonder [that] modern sociology brings so few surprises” [6]. But surely the last 40 years have brought
many surprises in the doings of men in society. Nor have revealing studies of these been
lacking: Sidney and Beatrice Webb, F. A. Voigt, von Hayek, Rauschning,
Heiden, Alan Bullock, Orwell, Koestler,
Hannah Arendt, Czeslaw Milosz, Mitrany, Schumpeter,
Carr, Churchill - no one can go through this list of names without recollecting
some books which have profoundly affected his outlook on contemporary society. Other authors of similar gravity come easily
to mind, but there are admittedly few sociologists who qualify to this class.
I would suggest that we might begin to remedy this
weakness by prohibiting the use of the term scientific in praise of a
study of human society, for a trial period of, say, 10 years. And in the meantime we should try training ourselves
to study human affairs by intense participation in human problems instead of by
detachment from them. We should know by
now that the most powerful moral influence flows from the terms in which
morality is interpreted and that the interpretation of history is a decisive
force of history. A self-consistent
society must therefore include .within its orthodoxy the terms in which it
states its orthodoxy. A consistently
moral society must foster a moralizing sociology and historiography, and it
must sustain a philosophy justifying morality and moralizing, as well as its
own role as the justifier of these. I think
we must depart all this way from the ideal of detachment in order to meet the
challenge voiced by MacLeod concerning the Newtonian approach to human affairs.
And now I should like to level a similar
anti-Newtonian challenge on R. W. Gerard’s paper [7].
I do admire his paper, but I am afraid
that this compliment is somewhat left-handed. For I am inclined to consider the fact that a
so learned, ingenious, and imaginative survey of living beings should deal so
perfunctorily with some of the most important questions concerning them, as
indicating a fundamental deficiency in biological thinking.
Gerard says that every higher type of organization is
“understandable in terms of the units and their relations of which it is built”
and adds that if we fail to predict their properties from those of their units,
this is due to lack of information about the circumstances, subject to unspecifiable chances. What does this mean? Of course, if the “relations” of the units
from which an organism is built include their relations within the organism,
then the statement says no more than that the organism is composed of parts. If, on the other hand - as it would seem - the
relations which explain the organism are thought to be those which the parts
are known to manifest outside the organism, then the statement is certainly
untrue. Electrons and nucleons are not
known to be sentient, while the higher animals are. If a rat laps up a solution of saccharine, the
rational explanation of this lies in the fact that the solution tastes sweet
and that the rat likes that. The tasting
and liking are facts that physics and chemistry as known today cannot explain.
And this conclusion gives the whole show away. Because it acknowledges a conscious desire by
an individual capable of such desire, it leads on further to the recognition of
deliberate actions by individuals and the possibilities of error on their part.
Thus a whole series of conceptions
emerges that are absent from physics and chemistry as known today. Indeed, nothing is relevant to biology, even
at the lowest level of life, unless it bears on the achievements of living
beings: achievements such as their perfection of form, their morphogenesis, or
the proper functioning of their organs; and the very conception of such achievements
implies a distinction between success or failure - a distinction unknown to
physics and chemistry.
But the distinction between success and failure is
present in, and is indeed essential to, the science of engineering; and the
logic of engineering does substantiate in fact what I am saying here of
biology. No physical or chemical investigation
of an object can tell us whether it is a machine and, if so, how it works. Only if we have previously discovered
that it is a machine, and found out also approximately how it works, can
the physical and chemical examination of the machine tell us anything useful
about it, as a machine. Similarly, physical
and chemical investigations can form part of biology only by bearing on previously
established biological achievements, such as shapeliness, morphogenesis, or
physiological functions.
A complete physical and chemical topography of a frog
would tell us nothing about it as a frog, unless we knew it previously as a
frog. And if the rules of scientific
detachment required that we limit ourselves exclusively to physical and chemical
observations, we would remain forever unaware of frogs or of any other living
beings, just as we would remain ignorant also by such observations of all
machines and other human contrivances.
The achievements which form the subject matter of
biology can be identified only by a kind of appraisal which requires a higher
degree of participation by the observer in his subject matter than can be
mediated by the tests of physics and chemistry. The current ideal of “scientificality”
which would refuse such participation would indeed destroy biology but for the
wise neglect of consistency on the part of its supporters.
But again, as in social theory, it is perilous to rely indefinitely on
a conceptual framework that denies reality to the things we actually believe in.
Shall we
continue, for example, to think of ourselves
as automata? Speaking at a symposium of
unrivaled distinction on the subject of “Cerebral mechanisms in behavior” in
1948, K. S. Lashley declared: “Our common meeting
ground is the faith to which we all subscribe, I believe, that the phenomena of
behavior and of mind are ultimately describable in the concepts of the physical
and mathematical sciences” [8]. Gerard, who was one of the participants on
whose behalf this was said, has - it seems to me - reaffirmed this faith in his
paper.
It is in fact taken almost universally for granted
among neurologists, who regard its acceptance as inherent in their claim to be
scientists. Yet I do not think that
anybody can hold this belief. It assumes,
for example, that Shakespeare’s conscious thoughts had no effect on the writing
of his plays; that the plays have been performed ever since by actors whose
thoughts had no effect on what they were doing, while successive generations of
audiences applauded them without being affected by the fact that they enjoyed
the plays. Awareness, of which Gerard
speaks only in skeptical quotation marks, was granted to Shakespeare apparently
only to keep him quiet while his nervous system got through the job of getting
his plays written.
Ideal of Scientific Detachment
Once more, I do not say these things here in order to
ridicule the great scientists who insist on the necessity of holding such
curious beliefs, but to make you aware of the terrific compulsion under which
they stand: the misleading compulsion exercised today by the ideal of scientific
detachment.
If this ideal could be removed by a revised conception
of scientific merit, the relation between mind and body could perhaps be
reconsidered on the following lines. Admitting
that no process known to be governed by the present laws of physics and
chemistry is also known to be accompanied by consciousness, we might yet
suppose that a future enlargement of physics and chemistry might account for
the sentience of certain material structures. It would seem unwarranted to retain for such
structures the conception of automatic functioning, which is derived from our present
physics and chemistry. Action and
reaction usually arise together in nature. Hence, it would seem reasonable to expect that
the new physics and chemistry, which would account for the production of
consciousness by material processes, would also allow for the reverse action,
that is, of conscious processes acting on their material substrate.
Only such a conception of the human mind can
acknowledge our claim to responsible personhood and account for the obligation
to treat our fellow-men as responsible persons. It alone makes it possible to acknowledge the
inherent independence of a mental growth which - though conditioned by
circumstances - is never determined by circumstances. It confirms, therefore, men’s capacity, and
their right, to serve the growth of thought; to seek the truth, aiming at universal
validity according to their own lights. It
permits us to hope that the firmament of ideals, from which we seek guidance
for our judgments and actions, may reflect to some extent the proper meaning of
our existence; and that other men, everywhere, are guided in fact in their own
way by the same endeavors. Thus it makes
it possible to conceive of a free society in which these independent strivings will
compete without mortal conflict. It
makes it possible to understand that the Soviet empire, founded on the assumption
that thought should be fashioned by the government in order to provide itself
with intellectual support, is now shaken by the rebellion of a people
suffocated by the imposition of a system of slipshod, dreary falsehoods.
But I will be accused of wandering far beyond the
responsibilities of science. The
question for science, I shall be told, is simply, what can and what cannot be observed.
I shall be told that all that can be
observed in a fellow-human being is behavior, and that
there is no occasion therefore to refer to mental states which not being
observable are no concern of science. This
is the behaviorist argument, and I think that both MacLeod and Gerard dislike
it, though they do not actually refute it. Let me show how I would try to meet this
argument and would establish the observability of another
man’s mind by an epistemology based on an extension of Gestalt theory.
I think the behaviorist argument goes wrong by failing
to take into account the difference between observing the workings of a mind as
mere events, as distinct from reading them as the signs of a mind’s working. It is the same difference as that which
obtains between focusing on the individual letters in a written text and
reading the text. The first is a detached
observation, the second I would call a convivial appreciation. I would go on from here to assert that the
objective, “focal,” observation of an intelligent mind’s workings is
impossible. You simply cannot keep track
of the mind’s workings in this manner. It is not possible to specify the particulars
of an intelligent behavior, and in fact you cannot even recognize the course of
such behavior, except by following its particulars comprehensively as the
manifestations of an intelligence at work through
them. But the moment you take in the
totality of the unspecifiable particulars which compose
intelligent behavior, you are not focusing on these particulars, you are not
observing them in a detached manner, but are focusing on the mind beyond them,
on the mind that is at work in these particulars. You are actually observing the mind
“convivially” in terms of particulars of which you remain only subsidiarily - and often only quite vaguely - aware [9].
Behaviorists claim falsely that they observe the
particulars of learning or intelligence without relying on their previously
established mental context. This is
sheer pretense. The terms used by them
would be unintelligible but for the fact that we appreciate the achievements of
their subjects by the exercise of our imaginative fellow feeling. It is this direct observation of the mind that
is primary, and the objectivist terms in which it is cast are merely a
subsequent elaboration of it which, though not without interest, must not be
allowed to serve as a disguise and a substitute for the direct cognizance of
the mind from which it is derived and by which it remains guided.
Admittedly, the observation of another mind involves a
participation in our subject matter which clearly exceeds the limits which the
ideal of greatest possible detachment would set us. But this in my view only demonstrates once
more the falsity of this ideal. The
observation of the ascending levels of organization surveyed by Gerard requires
a steadily increasing degree of participation of the observer in his subject
matter. And only by acknowledging this
fact can the observer recognize the consecutive levels of integration as
consecutive levels of new being, not specifiable in terms of lower level particulars.
Then it will be possible also to acknowledge that the
human mind, though conditioned by the nervous system, is pursuing in essential
independence its own nonmaterial objectives. And science can thus be attuned to the other
domains of human thought and cease to threaten them by its false standards of
detached objectivity. Science can be
reconciled then once more with the truth.
I shall not try to show, though
I believe it to be the case, that the false ideal of Newtonian
objectivity has caused as much harm to psychology as it has to sociology. I propose to close on a happier note by
congratulating the exact sciences, so attractively represented by Terrold Zacharias [9], on being free from this kind of trouble. They seem to be doing splendidly, in spite of
being - in my view - generally mistaken in what they think they are
doing. The lighthearted manner in which Zacharias dis-
483
cussed the possible alternatives which his
measurements of time may reveal is not merely an expression of his modesty: it
flows from the current view that scientific theories are but convenient summaries
of observed facts, or mere working hypotheses, or interpretative policies.
This noncommittal view of scientific theory can be
traced back to antiquity, and it came into prominence first in the conflict
between theology and Copernicanism. Pope Urban VIII insisted that Galileo should regard
the Copernican theory as a mere practical device for computing planetary
motions and not as a real explanation of the facts. Indeed, right from the publication of the
Copernican theory in 1543, the Copernicans fought bitterly against his
positivistic view of the theory, on which Catholic and Protestant theologians
equally insisted. It was Newton who
finally dealt the death blow to this view by his theory of gravitation,
published in 1687.
This conception of science, which had been used so far
only to reduce the status of science and to uphold the supremacy of religious
dogma, was revived two centuries later by Mach for the purpose of strictly
limiting the claims of science to observable facts. It has since become universally accepted. Yet this theory of science is but another
pretense, practiced in deference to a false ideal of science. Take the theory of general relativity for
which the project of Zacharias promises to supply a
decisive test. Since its first publication
40 years ago, general relativity has held a position of supreme interest in
science. But it would be grotesque to describe
it as the most convenient summary of the facts predicted by it. There are hardly any such facts, and such as
there may be can be memorized in a few minutes, while the understanding of
these facts by means of the general theory is a task requiring years of preparation
even by specially gifted students. Actually,
the program of the general theory was first set out by Mach in 1883, without
any experimental evidence to support it. It has held the allegiance of science and of
the whole world by the intellectual beauty of its representation of the
universe. Its rationality was regarded
as a token of its truth, exactly as the rationality of the Copernican theory was
so regarded by its early adherents who fought and suffered to uphold this
truth.
Let us drop these pretenses. No scientist is ever concerned with producing
the most convenient summary of a given set of facts. This is the task of the editors of encyclopedias
and the compilers of telephone directories. It is of the essence of a scientific theory
that it commits us to an indeterminate range of yet undreamed consequences that
may flow from it. We commit ourselves to
these, because we believe that by our theory we are making contact with a
reality of which our theory has revealed one aspect. It is this commitment that lends universal
intent to a scientist’s most original solitary thoughts. By acknowledging this frankly, we shall
restore science to the great family of human aspirations, by which men hope to fulfill
the purpose of their existence as thinking beings.
So it would seem that by abandoning the false ideal of
detachment in the epistemology of the exact sciences, we are led back to the
point once more which we had reached by a critique based on a similar revision
of our scientific ideals in respect to sociology and biology.
1. R. B. MacLeod, Science, this issue.
2. M. Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago, 1951),
P. 106; expanded in Encounter 7, No. 6, 5 (1956).
3. C. Kluckhohn and
D. Leighton, The Navaho (Harvard Univ.
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1946), p. 176.
4. V. G. Childe, What Happened in History (Pelican,
London), p. 15.
5. E. Glover,
War, Sadism and Pacifism (London, 1935), p. 38] explains war as follows:
“Tearing up ‘scraps of paper,’ ‘violating’ an ‘innocent little country,’
defending the ‘mother’ country, however much they refer to current realities,
are but echos of many phantasies
in which the ‘good’ mother or child is defended against the sinister (mostly
sexual) designs of the phantasied ‘bad’ father.” In the chapter entitled “The problem of
prevention,” we find on page 108 the following suggestion: “... to find out ...
how many dictators, foreign secretaries, diplomats and peace delegates suffer
from psycho-sexual impotence or have a secret fear of impotence. A prerequisite is the common recognition of
the important facts that impotence in some cases contributes to pacific
tendencies, whilst unconscious fear of impotence is a common cause of
war-mindedness and grandiosity.” For a
textbook summing up 11 years later the results of this movement, with a special
emphasis on the role of early toilet training, see Kimball Young, Social
Psychology (New York, 1946), for example p. 44.
6. W. J. H. Sprott, Science and Social Action (London,
1954), p. 5.
7. R. W. Gerard, Science 125, 429
(1957),
8. K. S. Lashley,
in Cerebral Mechanism in Behavior. The Hixon
Symposium,
L.
A. Jeifress, Ed. (New York and London, 1951), p. 112.
9. This conclusion controverts also G. Ryle’s thesis, expounded in The Concept of Mind, that it is
meaningless to speak of the mind as distinct from its workings.
10. J. Zacharias, Science 125, 427
(1957).
484